See here also:
"...the government has been engaged for too long in willful denial in order to subvert the Constitution..."
"To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions is a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy."
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014 1
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JESINOSKI ET UX. v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–684. Argued November 4, 2014—Decided January 13, 2015
Exactly three years after borrowing money from respondent Country- wide Home Loans, Inc., to refinance their home mortgage, petitioners Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski sent Countrywide and respondent Bank of America Home Loans, which had acquired Countrywide, a letter purporting to rescind the transaction. Bank of America replied, re- fusing to acknowledge the rescission’s validity. One year and one day later, the Jesinoskis filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaration of rescission and damages. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for respondents, concluding that a borrower can exer- cise the Truth in Lending Act’s right to rescind a loan, see 15 U. S. C. §1635(a), (f), only by filing a lawsuit within three years of the date the loan was consummated. The Jesinoskis’ complaint, filed four years and one day after the loan’s consummation, was ineffective. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s unequivocal terms—a bor- rower “shall have the right to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor . . . of his intention to do so” (emphasis added)—leave no doubt that re- scission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his in- tention to rescind. This conclusion is not altered by §1635(f), which states when the right to rescind must be exercised, but says nothing about how that right is exercised. Nor does §1635(g)—which states that “in addition to rescission the court may award relief . . . not re- lating to the right to rescind”—support respondents’ view that rescis- sion is necessarily a consequence of judicial action. And the fact that the Act modified the common-law condition precedent to rescission at
2 JESINOSKI v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. Syllabus
law, see §1635(b), hardly implies that the Act thereby codified rescis- sion in equity. Pp. 2–5.
729 F. 3d 1092, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.